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STUDENT NOTES
DIRECT RESORT TO THE COURTS TO RECOVER RATE
OVERCHARGES FOR UTILITY SERVICE
The problem herein discussed may, for present purposes, be
confined to the narrow question of whether, in a claim for over-
charges, the effect of the Public Service Commission's order or
orders presents a judicial or administrative question where the
claim is based on a schedule of rates fixed by the Public Service
Commission or where such claim is based on the determination of
what duly enacted schedule of rates was in existence at a given
time.
Any discussion of this nature necessitates determining the
relative functions of administrative bodies and the courts. The
jurisdiction of an administrative body depends entirely on the
statutory grant. Such a body must act strictly within the limits
of its jurisdiction and in the absence thereof its determinations
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are void.' It may be said that not only legislative functions may
be delegated to a commission, but executive and judicial functions
may as well be so delegated? One of the many reasons given for
the creation of various commissions is said to be to relieve some
of the congested traffic in the courts and it has been argued that
if judicial power is so delegated to a commission, the determina-
tions of that body should be made final.? The Workman's Com-
pensation Commission is cited as an example where judicial power
has been granted to a commission, and an argument in favor of
such delegation is that it has more time to deal rightly with
the facts of each particular case and are not hampered by such
iron clad rules as the "hearsay rule".' In other words, a busi-
ness man expects a body of business men who use common every-
day methods to ascertain facts, to hear his cause, and give a
decision based on the principle of friendly adjustment."
The elementary formula that "questions of fact are for the
commission and questions of law are for the court", has been the
customary test of the functional division between commissions
and courts. This dichotomy has at'times been a convenient in-
strument in our judicial process, and yet in application the form-
ula becomes somewhat nebulous when one remembers that there
is fundamentally no inherent distinction between questions of fact
and questions of law.'
In this general connection, Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out
a practical distinction between legislative and judicial action
when he said, "A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and en-
forces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under
laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end.
'State Public Utilities Commission v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 274 Ill. 36 113
NT. E. 162 (1916); Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Commerce Commission,
315 Ill. 461, 146 N. E. 606 (1925); People ex rel. New York Rys. Co. v. Public
Service Commission of First Dist., 223 N. Y. 373, 119 N. E. 848 (1918);
Cleveland Provision Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 104 Ohio St. 253, 135
N. E. 612, 23 A. L. R. 404 (1922).
2 Harriman, The Development of Administrative Law in the 'United States
(1916) 25 YALE L. J. 658, 659.
3 Hard'an, Judicial Review as a Requirement of Due Process in Bate Regu-
lation (1921) 30 YA.E L. J. 681.
'Ross, The Applicability of Common Law Bules of Ruidenee in Proceedings
Before Workmen's Compensation Commissions (1922) 36 IARV. L. REv. 263.
5Winslow, Legislative Indictment of the Courts (1916) 29 HAMv. L. REV.
395.
8See Cook, Statements of Fact in Code Pleading (1921) 21 CoL. L. REV.
416; Thayer, Law and Fact in Jury Trials (1890) 4 HAnv. L. REV. 147;
DICinson, JusIcE AND THE SUPREMACY OF THE LAw (1927 50-55, 151-153,
167-170, 313-319; Cavers, "Questions of Law" in Lake Cargo Bate Regula-
tion (1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 397 (1931).
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1933], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol39/iss3/4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes ex-
isting conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter
to all or some parts of those subject to the power.'"
Rate-making is commonly said to be primarily a legislative
function which has been delegated to commisions and is, of course,
subject to review by the judiciary. Following out the idea of Mr.
Justice Holmes, the commission may look only to the present or
future, while the judiciary has jurisdiction to enforce liabilities
as they stand on present or past facts.
Why has this function of rate-making been delegated to com-
missions? It appears to be the outcome of a political develop-
ment, which, in the writers' minds has passed through four
rather ill defined stages. The first, a pre-public service commis-
sion development, is expressed in the famous case of Munn v.
Illinois,° where it is said that regulation of utilities is a matter for
final determination by the legislature. A few years later the
Court said that regulatory power may be delegated by the Legis-
lature to a commission, subject, however, to judicial review in
case of any abuse of discretion. ' The next landmark is perhaps,
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota,' where a question of
confiscatory rates was held to be reviewable by the courts under
the due process clause, but here the scope of review seems to be
confined to a pure question of law. The last stage begins with,
perhaps ends with, the much discussed case of Ohio Valley Water
Co. v. Ben Avon Borough," where the court enlarged the scope of
review to in6lude not only questions of law but an independent
re-examination of the facts as well. Perhaps this final step may
be justified by the consideration that the personnel of the various
commissions changes frequently and sometimes is not composed of
technically trained men, and by the fact that vast interests are
very often at stake.
On the other hand, by the weight of authority, the legal con-
struction of administrative orders, whether orders of the Public
Service Commission,' or orders of the Interstate Commerce Coin-
7 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67 (1908).
8 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra n. 7. Contra: People v. Wil-
cox, 194 N. Y. 383, 87 N. E. 517 (1909), discussed in Note (1909) 9 CoL.
L. REv. 341.
8 94 U. S. 113, 133, 24 L. ed. 597 (1876).
10116 U. S. 307, 331, 6 S. Ct. 334, 338, 1191 (1886).
"134 U. S. 418, 10 S. Ct. 462 (1890).
1253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 572 (1920).
"Alabama Power Co. v. Patterson, 138 So. 417 (Ala. 1931). Here the
plaintiff sought to recover overcharges for the use of electricity. Plaintiff
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mission, ' have been held for the courts in the first instance. A
conspicuous example is Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants'
Elevator Co.' in which Mr. Justice Brandeis said, "It is true that
uniformity is the paramount purpose of the Commerce Act. But
it is not true that uniformity in construction of the tariff can be
attained only through a preliminary resort to the Commission to
settle the construction in dispute. Every question of construction
of a tariff is deemed a question of law; and where the question
concerns an interstate tariff it is one of Federal law."
Between the two extremes of rate-making and construction
of a tariff, lie cases calling for the exercise of the so-called "ad-
ministrative discretion", where the court has refused to take
jurisdiction because of no preliminary resort to the commission.
Such in general, has been the holding in cases involving the rea-
sonableness of a rule or practice of the public service corpora-
tion,'s or discrimination,1' or the classification of certain articles
under different tariffs."
The recent West Virginia case of Natural Gas Co. of West
resided in a city where current was furnished by company A, which used a
steam plant. Company A merged with company B. Company B later merged
with companies C and D to become a new company, E, which generated its
current by means of water power. Company E charged a higher schedule
of rates than the company originally serving the city. The question raised
was: "What rate is the legal rate?" The court said, "The construction of
rate schedules, and determination of which schedule is effective to a given
state of facts, is purely a judicial function, one subject to exercise by the
courts alone, and the Alabama Public Service Commission has no power nor
authority to determine that issue. Its function is to fix rates for the future,
to pass upon what is and what is not a reasonable rate, not to decide which
of two tariffs is in effect at a given time and applicable to a given state
of facts."
14 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285, 42
S. Ct. 477 (1922); Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. F. W. Cook Brewing
Co., 223 U. S. 70, 32 S. Ct. 189 (1912); Pa. R. R. Co. v. International Coal
Mining Co., 230 U. S. 184, 33 S. Ct. 893 (1912); Pa. R. R. Co. v. Puritan
Coal Co., 237 U. S. 121, 134, 35 S. Ct. 484 (1915); Pa. R. R. Co. v. Sonman
Coal Co., 242 U. S. 120, 37 S. Ct. 46 (1915); Hite v. Central R. R. Co. of
N. J., 171 Fed. 370 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1909); Collins v. Davis, 283 Fed. 837
(D. Conn., 1922); Gimbel v. Barrett, 215 Fed. 1904 (E. D. Pa., 1914);
Gustafson v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 296 Ill. 41, 129 N. E. 516 (1921);
Wolverine Brass Works v. Southern R. R. Co., 187 Mich. 393, 153 N. W.
773 (1915); Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Rogers, 75 W. Va. 556, 84 S. E.
248, 249 (1915). Contra: Cheney v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 227 Mass.
336, 116 N. E. 411 (1917).
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., supra n. 14.
S tate ex rel. Croy v. Bluefield Water Works Co., 86 W. Va. 260, 103 S.
E. 340 (1920); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Solum, 247 U. S. 477, 483, 38 S.
Ct. 550 (1918).
1 orrisdale Coal Co. v. Pa. R. R. Co., 230 U. S. 304, 33 S. Ct. 938 (1910);
Robinson v. B. & 0. R. Co., 222 U. S. 506, 32 S. Ct. 114 (1911).
IsDirector General v. Viscose Co., 254 U. S. 498, 41.S. Ct. 151 (1921).
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Virginia v. Sommerville, Judge,"' presents an interesting angle of
this problem. In that case the question was presented as to
whether, in a consumers' action for overcharges, resort must
first be had to the Commission, or whether the circuit court had
jurisdiction in the first instance. An order had been entered
effective April 15, 1920, fixing the rate at forty cents per thousand
cubic feet of gas, subject to a. discount of two cents per thousand
cubic feet, if paid before the twelfth day of the month following.
In 1922 the Gas Company petitioned for an increase in rates, and
about the 15th day of June, 1924, an order was made fixing the
rate at fifty-two cents per thousand cubic feet, with two cents
discount. This latter order was to expire by its own terms about
the 15th day of December, 1927, and was "granted for the ex-
tension of gas territory and for the production of additional gas".
The Gas Company, after the expiration of this period, continued
to charge the fifty-two cents less two cents discount for cash. A
representative suit was commenced by the gas consumers against
the Gas Company in the circuit court. The Gas Company then
sought a Writ of Prohibition in the Supreme Court of Appeals,
claiming, among other things, that the circuit court had no juris-
diction, but that resort must first be had to the Public Service
Commission. The Supreme Court of Appeals, in denying the writ,
said, "The question whether the charges made by the Gas Com-
pany were in excess of the legally prescribed rate in effect at the
time the charges were made, presents a judicial problem of which
the circuit court - has jurisdiction." The court further
said, "The solution will depend not upon whether the charges
were in excess of a reasonable rate, but whether they were in ex-
cess of the lawfully established rate."
Relative to this question of overcharges, there has always
been a common law right to recover sums in excess of a reason-
able rate or of a legally established rate.' Some states have by
statute, however, made it necessary to apply to the commission in
the first instance before resort may be had to the courts ;' others
19166 S. E. 852 (W. Va., 1932).
Southern Ry. Co. of Kansas v. Frankfort Distillery, 233 Ky. 711, 26
S. W. (2d) 1025, certiorari denied 51 S. Ct. 75 (1930); Centre County Lime
Co. v. Public Service Comm'n. of Pa., 103 Pa. Super. Ct. 179, 157 Atl. 815
(1931).
1"Centre County Lime Co. v. Public Service Comm'n. of Pa., supnz n. 20:
S.... the right accruing to a shipper required to pay an excessive rate and
to the procedure provided by our Public Service Company Law for its en-
forcement . . . . payment, recognized and enforceable under the Common
Law. Our Statute requires him to institute his claim for reparations be-
fore the commission in the first instance."
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have permitted, or at least have purported to permit, relief to be
sought either before the commission or before the courts.' If
one looks solely to the language of the Interstate Commerce Act,
it would appear that concurrent remedies exist, since it provides
for going before either the Commission or the courts, although an
election between the two must be made.' A study of a long line
of cases interpreting this section discloses that they may be divid-
ed into two groups: namely, those involving an isolated question
of overcharges, and those involving overcharges coupled with the
construction of a tariff. Each in turn may be subdivided under
two heads: (a) where a determination of the amount of over-
charges involves also some phase of "administrative discretion",
such as the case of Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Abilene Oil Co., where
there was a pure question of overcharges, yet the court held that
resort must first be had to the Commission, because there was
present a question involving "administrative discretion", namely,
unreasonableness of a rate, discrimination, and preference; (b)
- where a determination of the amount of overcharges involved no
question of construction, or "administrative discretion", such as
Chesapeake & Ohio R. B. Co. v. Rogers,' where the sole question
was whether the complainant should be charged for nineteen or
nine days demurrage, the tariff per se having nothing to do with
the question as to how many days the cars were on the siding.
There the court said that there was no question of "administrative
discreion" and the trial court had jurisdiction in the first in-
stance.
In the second group, namely, those involving questions of
construction as well as overcharges, we have (a) the situation
where the construction involves some phase of "administrative
2'Wis. STAT. (1929) § 195.37 (3) "All claims provided for in subsection
(1) except for straight overcharges, shall be filed with the Commission ....
(4) For recovery of straight overcharges which mean charges in excess of
those applicable under the lawful tariffs on file with the commissipn, neither
this section or section 195.38 will be deemed exclusive remedies ...... .
(Italics ours.)
49 U. S. C. A. § 9 (1926): "Any person or persons claiming to be
damaged by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter
may either make complaint to the commission as hereinafter provided for,
or may bring suit in his or their Own behalf for the recovery of damages
for which such common carrier may be liable under the provisions of this
chapter, in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction;
but such person or persons shall not have the right to pursue both of
said remedies, and must in each case elect which one of the two methods
of procedure herein provided for he or they will adopt."
204 U. S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350 (1907).
75 W. Va. 556, 84 S. E. 248, 249 (1915).
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discretion". In Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. The American Tie and,
Lumber Co., ' a suit for overcharges involved the construction of
the tariff which in turn depended on whether or not the word
"lumber" as used in the published tariff included oak ties. The
court held that this question was obviously not one solely of con-
struction and it was, therefore, necessary that resort be had to
the Commission for the determination of this fact. Then we
have (b) the situation where the construction of a present or
past tariff involves no question of "administrative discretion".
It was decided in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator
Go."' that such determination is for the courts. From these cases
it appears that under the Interstate Commerce Act, the remedy
in all cases of reparation is not concurrent; and it is submitted
that where a question of "administrative discretion" is involved,
one must resort to the Commission in the first instance, while in
all cases involving no such discretion resort may be had directly
to the courts.
The section of the West Virginia Revised Code relative to
the recovery of damages' corresponds, almost verbatim with the
section of the Interstate Commerce Act set out in footnote 23,
except that in the latter in dealing with jurisdiction, the disjunc-
tive is used, while in the former the conjunctive appears. The
West Virginia provision, however, standing alone, appears to the
writers to be somewhat ambigious in providing that (italics ours)
" ... any person .... claiming to be damaged - may make
complaint to the commission . . . . and bring suit . . . . for the
recovery of the damages in any circuit court having jurisdiction."
The case of Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Public Service
Commission,' throws considerable light on this section of the
Code. In that case the Electric Company contracted with one S
to furnish electricity for his building at a definite rate for a per-
iod of ten years. After nine years the Steel Company acquired
the building together with the contract and was charged a great-
er newly established rate than that agreed to under the S con-
tract. The Steel Company then sought an order of reparation
before the Public Service Commission. The Commission refused
to take jurisdiction and upon appeal to the court, it was held that
a clear remedy at law existed, and, therefore, the Steel Company
234 U. S. 138, 34 S. Ct. 885 (1914).
,upra n. 14.
W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 27, art. 4, § 7.
o 90 W. Va. 74, 110 S. E. 489 (1922).
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must go to the court in the first instance. The case presented
simply a question of overcharges depending on.whether the rate
prescribed by the S contract, or the rate prescribed by the Com-
mission was the applicable one and was unassociated with any
phase of "administrative discretion". Hence, it is submitted,
that, on such a problem of overcharges, the jurisdiction of the
commission and the courts is not concurrent, but that it is manda-
tory to go to the courts in the first instance,
In the Gas case" the court said that no problem of the rea-
sonableness of rates was involved, and its final determination must
therefore, at the most, involve no more than a question of over-
charges depending upon the judicial determination of what rate
was in existence after the expiration of the 1924 order, in other
words, construction. The question of construction of a legally
established tariff has been held clearly a matter for the courts
in the Merchants' Elevator' case, cited with approval by the West
Virginia court in the Gas case. Construing the West Virginia
statute in the light of the cases interpreting the Interstate Com-
merce Act and having regard to the Wheeling Steel case, and
Alabama Power Co. v. Patterson," there is no doubt that the hold-
ing on the application for a writ of prohibition in the Gas case
was sound.
-CARLS H. HADEN.
-WESLEY R. TINKER, JR.
"0Supra n. 19.
nBupra n. 14.
"Due to the similarity between the provisions, of the Interstate Commerce
Act, supra n. 23, and of the Revised Code of West Virginia, and the fact
that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has used the cases in-
terpreting the Interstate Commerce Act, the writers feel justified in using
those United States Subreme Court decisions in analyzing this problem.
ISupra n. 13.
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1933], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol39/iss3/4
